Abstract: Construction claims are considered by many project participants to be one of the most disruptive and unpleasant events of a project. Construction claims occur for various reasons. There is a need to understand the dynamic nature between construction claims and opportunistic bidding. An analytical model, the Claims Decision Model ͑CDM͒, based on ''game theory,'' was developed to study opportunistic bidding and construction claims. This model explains ͑1͒ how people behave during a potential or existing claiming situation, ͑2͒ how different claiming situations are related to opportunistic bidding behavior, and ͑3͒ what situations encourage or discourage opportunistic behavior. The results of this pilot study indicate that the equilibrium solution of a construction claim is to negotiate and settle, which concurs with most of the claim cases in the industry. The possible range of a negotiation settlement is obtained in this paper. The model provides the rationale for recent innovations to manage disputes. The model can also help project owners identify the possibility of opportunistic bidding, and can assist the project participants in analyzing construction claims.
Introduction
It is a commonly recognized fact that the number of construction claims and disputes has been increasing and has become a burden to construction industry, particularly during the economic slowdown ͑Rubin et al. 1983; Adrian 1993; Jergeas and Hartman 1994; Kangari 1994; Levin 1998 . Kangari ͑1994͒ argued the following: ''The sluggish global economy has created an environment in which construction firms are forced to bid projects at or below minimum profit level. ...it is not surprising that the number of disputes within the construction industry continues to increase.'' Levin ͑1998͒ further suggested that claims have become an integral part of the building process. Especially in a competitive bidding scheme and public funded projects, it is not unusual for contractors to bid low on a project and hope to recover the loss through negotiations or claims. Zack Jr. ͑1993͒ calls this phenomenon ''bid your claims,'' or as we call it in this paper, ''opportunistic bidding.'' Opportunistic bidding is more common during a slow-moving economy or recession. In general, opportunistic bidding may include a contractor's intentional ignorance of possible risks involved that may significantly increase costs or decrease profitability, such as the use of the most optimistic cost estimation for the bid price.
Although Ioannou and Leu ͑1993͒ and Kangari ͑1994͒ suggest that the number of claims and disputes is related to opportunistic bidding, we do not suggest that most claims happen because of opportunistic bidding. In this paper we will focus on how opportunistic behavior is related to claims, and how to analyze a potential or existing claiming situation. An analytical model for analyzing opportunistic bidding and construction claims will be presented in this paper. The objective of developing the model is to help owners and contractors understand the underlying economic mechanism of a claim so that they can develop effective project procurement strategies and claim administration programs or policies.
This paper begins with a short discussion of existing research on opportunistic bidding and construction claims. Next is a brief introduction of game theory, the underlying principle of the model. Then we will present an analytical framework based on game theory for analyzing the claims and opportunistic bidding. Following is an illustrative example to demonstrate how the analytical framework can be applied in practice to forecast potential claims and opportunistic bidding and to prescribe helpful procurement strategies. Then we will formally state and prove the propositions and corollaries resulting from the analysis, and derive the decision rules and strategies for owners and contractors.
Existing Research
A claim can be defined as a right given to the party who deserves a request for compensation for damages incurred by the other party ͑Simon 1979͒. A construction claim can be defined as ''a request by a construction contractor for compensation over and above the agreed-upon contract amount for additional work or damages supposedly resulting from events that were not included in the initial contract'' ͑Adrian 1993͒. However, the existence of a right is very subjective because of the complexity of the construction contract and process. Furthermore, the amount of money involved in a construction project is usually so large that a small discrepancy in the contract interpretation will cause significant impact on the project profit. Thus, Adrian ͑1993͒ and Levin ͑1998͒ argue that the increased complexity and scale of the building process is one of the major reasons for increasing the number of claims.
A survey study by Semple et al. ͑1994͒ concludes that the most common causes of claims are ''increase in scopes,'' ''cold weather,'' ''restricted access,'' and ''acceleration.'' Adrian ͑1993͒ summarizes other major reasons, such as the relatively low profitability of the construction industry, and the changing of the project delivery systems. Jergeas and Hartman ͑1994͒ list some other well known reasons that claims may arise, such as inadequate bid information, faulty or late owner-supplied equipment and material, inferior quality of drawings or specifications, and stop-and-go operations. Kumaraswamy and Yogeswaran ͑1998͒ conclude, based on 91 projects, that the most crucial sources of claims include unclear or inadequate documentation, late instructions, variations initiated by the employer/engineer, measurement related issues, inclement weather, and time extension assessment.
However, Semple et al. ͑1994͒ point out that the fundamental causes and real costs associated with claims and disputes are not well understood. Thus, there is a need to further investigate the following fundamental issues: when opportunistic bidding will occur, what is the relationship between opportunistic bidding and construction claims, and how to quantitatively evaluate the claims due to opportunistic bidding. In this pilot study, an analytical economic model was developed based on game theory to provide a practical tool to analyze opportunistic bidding and construction claims and provide an alternative research methodology. The following sections outline the basic concept of game theory and explain the details of the model.
Game Theory
Game theory can be defined as ''the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers'' ͑Myerson 1991͒. Therefore, it is critical that readers avoid making any negative ethical implications on ''playing games.'' Among economic theories, game theory has been successfully applied to many important issues, such as negotiations, finance, and imperfect markets. In construction, conflicts among builders and owners are very common, particularly in a bidding or claiming situation, and game theory can be used to analyze the situation systematically. The following sections describe the basic concepts of game theory that are closely related to opportunistic bidding and construction claims.
Types of Games
There are two basic types of games, static games and dynamic games, in terms of the timing of decision making. In a static game, the players act simultaneously. Note that ''simultaneously'' here means that each player makes decisions without knowing the decisions made by others. On the contrary, in a dynamic game, the players act sequentially. Due to the nature of bidding and claim, the dynamic game will be used to model and analyze claims and opportunistic bidding.
Players in a dynamic game move sequentially instead of simultaneously. It is more intuitive to represent a dynamic game by a treelike structure, also called the ''extensive form'' representation. We will use the following Market Entry example to demonstrate the concepts of a game analysis. A new firm, New Inc., wants to enter a market to compete with a monopoly firm, Old Inc. The monopoly firm does not want the new firm to enter the market because the new entry will reduce the old firm's profits. Therefore, Old Inc. threatens New Inc. with a price war if New Inc. enters the market. Fig. 1 shows the extensive form of the market entry game. If the payoff matrix shown in Fig. 1 is known to all players, the payoff matrix is a ''common knowledge'' to all players and this game is called a game of ''complete information.'' Conversely, if each player's possible payoff is privately known by that player only, the game is called a game with incomplete or asymmetric information. The game tree shows ͑1͒ first, New Inc. chooses to enter the market or not, and then Old Inc. chooses to start a price war or not, and ͑2͒ the payoff of each decision combination. Note that the players of a game are assumed to be rational. This is one of the most important assumptions in most economic theories. In other words, it is assumed that the players will always try to maximize their payoffs. Also, for clarity and convenience we shall assume that the players are risk neutral; that is, the player's utility function is: u(x)ϭx, where x is the player's monetary payoff. In general, the utility function can be modified according to the player's risk attitude ͑Clemen 1991͒.
Game Solution: Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium
In order to answer what each prisoner will play/behave in this game, we shall introduce the concept of ''Nash equilibrium,'' one of the most important concepts in game theory. The Nash equilibrium is a set of actions that will be chosen by each player. In other words, in a Nash equilibrium, each player's strategy should be the best response to the other player's strategy, and no player wants to deviate from the equilibrium solution. Thus, the equilibrium or solution is ''strategically stable'' or ''self-enforcing'' ͑Gibbons 1992͒.
A conjecture of the solution of the Market Entry game is that New Inc. will ''stay out'' because Old Inc. threatens to ''start a price war'' if New Inc. plays ''enter.'' However, Fig. 1 shows that the threat to start a price war is not credible because Old Inc. can only be worse off by starting a price war if New Inc. does enter. On the other hand, New Inc. knows the incredibility of the threat, and therefore will maximize the payoff by playing ''enter.'' As a result, the Subgame-Perfect Nash equilibrium of the market entry game is ͑enter, no price war͒ a strategically stable solution that does not rely on the player to carry out an incredible threat. The game in Fig. 1 is called a ''dynamic game of complete information.'' A dynamic game can be solved by maximizing each player's payoff backward recursively along the game tree ͑Gibbons 1992͒. We shall apply this technique in solving the construction bidding and claiming game. 
Claims Decision Model for Analyzing Opportunistic Bidding and Claims
Based on game theories and authors' own experiences, we developed a model for analyzing opportunistic bidding and construction claims. This analytical model, named the Claims Decision Model ͑CDM͒, starts by using a game tree to express the claiming and potential opportunistic bidding behavior in construction. All important underlying assumptions will be explicitly pointed out. In Case I the solution of the bidding and claiming game will be obtained by assuming that there is no counteroffer in a claim negotiation. In Case II the ''no counteroffer'' assumption is relaxed and the equilibrium solution is further refined. In Case III the game and its solution are generalized.
Assumptions and the Extensive Form of the Claiming and Bidding Game
The framework for analyzing opportunistic bidding and claiming in a dynamic game expressed in an extensive form as shown in Fig. 2 , where B is the builder and O is the owner. First, we shall consider the builder's actions: suppose that in order to outbid other competitors in a very competitive situation, the builder opportunistically cuts down a portion of the minimum profit by $l and wins the contract. In this case, the owner will obtain the bid cutting benefit $l if there is no claim. Therefore, if the builder does not claim, then the payoffs for the builder and the owner will be $(Ϫl,l), respectively. Second, we have the owner's actions: if the builder claims and the amount is $ p, it will come to the owner's decision. Note that here we ignore the time value of money for the time period of the claiming and litigation process. After a claim is filed, the owner has two choices: the owner will either ''negotiate'' with the builder and prepare to offer $gp, where g is a ratio between 0 and 1, or ''not negotiate'' at all and reject the claims.
Third, we have the builder's actions: according to Fig. 2 , if the owner's decision is not negotiate, the builder has to decide to ''sue'' or ''not sue.'' If the owner decides negotiate, the builder's question is to ''accept'' or ''not accept.'' Consider the case that the builder decides to sue, the tree specifies that he will win with probability q and get compensation $ p from the owner. The total payoff if the builder wins the lawsuit would be pϪcϪl, where c is defined as the builder's litigation opportunity cost. Opportunity cost is defined as ''the lost benefit that the best alternative course of action could provide'' ͑Maher 1997͒. Note that by this definition, the alternative other than sue should be not sue. Not sue will cost the builder $0, but sue will not only incur the attorney and court fees but also cause possible interruptions and spoil the relationship with the owner, hence reducing the builder's opportunity to work for the owner again in other future projects. Therefore the litigation opportunity cost c should include the explicit cost, such as attorney fees and the expenses of preparing the lawsuit, and the implicit cost of possible interruptions and the damage of his credit worthiness. On the other hand, the total payoff for the owner if the builder wins would be ϪpϪdϩl, where d is the owner's litigation opportunity cost. Note that d also includes the owner's explicit and implicit cost as the result of litigation.
Let us now turn to the builder's actions if the owner decides to negotiate. If the owner offers $gp to settle, then the builder will have to decide to accept or not accept. If the negotiation fails, everything is the same as if there were no negotiation in the first place. However, although the payoff has a tie between negotiate and not negotiate, a rational decision maker should choose not negotiate, since negotiation will take extra efforts. Note that the tree in Fig. 2 implies an assumption that the negotiation is a one-time negotiation; that is, there is no counteroffer from the builder. This assumption will be relaxed later in this paper to allow the counteroffer for a more general analysis. The equilibrium solutions can be solved backward recursively through the aid of the extensive form tree. The conditions for the builder to claim or not will also be obtained.
Case I. No Counteroffer: g Is Fixed
The analysis starts from the simplest case when there is no counteroffer. The negotiation offer ratio, g, as shown in Fig. 2 is given in advance before the negotiation takes place and is assumed to be fixed and known by both parties. However, readers should keep in mind that g will become flexible later in Case II because of the counteroffer. We will solve the game backward recursively through the following steps.
͑1͒ Solution I: Builder ''claim''→Owner ''not negotiate'' →Builder ''sue.'' 1. Solving from the back, the expected payoff from the lawsuit could be calculated by Eq. ͑1͒ under the risk-neutral assumption. The tree shown in Fig. 3͑a͒ can be obtained, "q͑ pϪcϪl ͒ϩ͑ 1Ϫq ͒͑ ϪcϪl ͒, q͑ϪpϪdϩl ͒ϩ͑ 1Ϫq ͒ ϫ͑Ϫdϩl ͒…ϭ͑ qpϪcϪl, ϪqpϪdϩl ͒ (1) 2. The builder will sue if the payoff from the lawsuit is greater than or equal to the payoff from not sue. The condition for the builder to sue would be qpуc as shown in the following equation and the game tree in Fig. 3͑a͒ can be obtained: qpϪcϪlуϪl⇒qpуc (2) Given that the builder's optimal choice is to sue under the condition qpуc, the solution of the subgame of sue or not sue shown in Fig. 3͑a͒ can be given by Eq. ͑1͒. The game tree in Fig. 3͑b͒ can be obtained. 3. Observing the subgame of not accept or accept in Fig. 3͑b͒ , the builder will not accept the negotiation offer if the following equation is met, and this subgame will be replaced by the payoffs matrix of not accept as shown in Fig. 3͑c͒ : qpϪcϪlуgpϪl⇒qpϪcуgp (3) The intuition of condition ͑3͒ is that if the expected litigation payoff, qpϪc, is greater than the payoff from the negotiation offer, gp, the builder will reject the owner's offer. 4. As shown in Fig. 3͑c͒ , the owner has the same payoff for not negotiate and negotiate. However, as discussed above, the owner should decide not negotiate, because the not negotiate decision does not incur negotiation cost, which is suppressed in the game tree. Therefore, this subgame will be replaced by the payoffs of not negotiate as shown in Fig. 3͑d͒ . 5. As shown in Fig. 3͑d͒ , the builder will claim if qpϪcϪl уϪl, that is, qpуc. Note that qpуc will be satisfied given Eq. ͑3͒. Therefore, under the conditions that qpϪcуgp, the equilibrium path is as follows: Builder ''claim $ p'' →Owner ''not negotiate'' ͑because he knows that the builder will ''not accept'' his offer)→Builder ''sue.'' The equilibrium of each subgame and the equilibrium path for the game are shown in Fig. 4 . Here the equilibrium path means the path through the game tree followed in equilibrium and the path should be unique in each game tree. ͑2͒ Solution II: Builder ''claim''→Owner ''negotiate'' →Builder ''accept.'' By the same token, we may solve the game and obtain the solution shown in Fig. 5 . The following equation shows the conditions for solution II:
The intuition in condition ͑4͒ is that if the negotiation offer, gp, is greater than the builder's litigation payoff, qpϪc, and less than the owner's litigation loss, qpϩd, the owner and builder would choose to negotiate. ͑3͒ Solution III: Builder ''claim''→Owner ''not negotiate'' →Builder ''sue.'' Similarly, we can find the third solution shown in Fig. 6 and solve for the equilibrium conditions expressed in 
The intuition is that the builder will not claim when the chance of winning the lawsuit is low and/or the litigation's opportunity cost is relatively high.
Case II. Counteroffer is Allowed: g is Flexible
A counteroffer is allowed in this section so that the negotiation offer ratio, g, is changeable in the process of negotiation, like most cases in the real world. We will show that when the counteroffer is allowed, solutions I and III in case I will converge to solution II. ͑1͒ Solution I to solution II. Compare the two solutions shown in Figs. 4 and 5. The total payoff for the builder and owner is (qpϪcϪl,ϪqpϪdϩl) in solution I, and is (gpϪl,Ϫgpϩl) in solution II. Note that if the payoff of the negotiate and accept path in solution II, (gpϪl,Ϫgpϩl), is greater than the payoff in solution I, (qlϪcϪl,ϪqpϪdϩl), i.e., (gpϪl,Ϫgpϩl)у(qp ϪcϪl,ϪqpϪdϩl), then both parties will want to switch from not negotiate to negotiate and accept. To achieve (gpϪl,Ϫgp ϩl)у(qlϪcϪl,ϪqpϪdϩl), for the builder, the following condition has to be satisfied: gpϪlуqpϪlϪc⇒gpуqpϪc
and for the owner, the following condition has to be satisfied:
Conditions ͑7͒ and ͑8͒ can be combined and become qpϪcрgpрqpϩd
Note that for all q, c, d, pу0 it must be true that qpϪcрqp ϩd. Thus there must be a negotiation offer ratio, g, such that condition ͑9͒ is satisfied. As a result, to negotiate and accept is always a better alternative than solution I since both parties can always determine a ratio ''g'' through the negotiation process to meet condition ͑9͒. Also in the negotiation, no one can be better off without someone being made worse off; that is, it has reached the so-called ''Pareto-efficiency'' ͑Binmore 1992͒. ͑2͒ Solution III to solution II. Similarly, solution III will also converge to solution II since both parties can seek to achieve Pareto optimal by changing g to satisfy condition ͑9͒.
͑3͒ Equilibrium solution: the Nash equilibrium. As argued in case I, the builder will always want to claim given that qpуc. Once the builder decides to ''claim,'' the only plausible and stable solution will be solution II, to negotiate and accept. This solution is this game's Nash equilibrium. Two important results are obtained: 1. The relationship among q, c, and p determines whether the builder will claim or not. The builder will claim if and only if qpуc. 2. The relationship among q, c, d, and p determines a set of possible negotiation offer ratios. The final negotiation offer ratio will have to satisfy condition ͑9͒, i.e., g͕x:qpϪcрxpрqpϩd͖
Case III. pÄa C and qÄq"a…: General Case
From case I, the builder's payoff from litigation is qpϪcϪl. However, suppose that p has no upper limit and can be any large amount, one may find that the builder's payoff qpϪcϪl can also be infinitely large and the builder will always want to ''sue'' to get this payoff. Obviously, the conjecture that qpϪcϪl can be infinitely large is not reasonable. Careful readers may have found that when we say ''qpϪcϪl can also be infinitely large,'' q is being incorrectly assumed to be fixed as p grows, and this error makes qp get unreasonably large. This problem leads us to a more general and realistic analysis of the bidding/claiming game. ͑1͒ Probability of winning the lawsuit. Let C be the cost of a construction project. Define the claim ratio, a, as the claim amount divided by the project cost; that is, aϭp/C. It can be rewritten as
Let q be the probability of winning as defined previously except that now q depends on the builder's claim amount, p, or more precisely, the builder's ''claim ratio,'' a. It is straightforward and reasonable to assume that for the same claim case, the probability of winning a lawsuit is negatively related to the claim ratio. For example, for the same claim, the probability of winning a lawsuit, q, with claim ratio aϭ0.1 must be much higher than the probability with claim ratio aϭ0.5. In other words, one cannot raise the claim amount dramatically without lowering his probability of winning significantly. Mathematically, the winning probability of a specific lawsuit can be expressed as a decreasing ͑not strictly͒ or nonincreasing function of the claim ratio; that is, q(a 1 ) рq(a 2 ) for any claim ratios a 1 уa 2 . An example of q(a) can be depicted as shown in Fig. 8 . This illustrative q(a) will be used as a base case for our further analyses. In fact, q(a) will be depending on the unique situations in different cases. It can be shown that we do not need to know the exact form of q(a) as long as the existence of the maximum of an expected lawsuit payoff, q(a*)p(a*), is guaranteed, where a* denotes the ''optimal claim ratio.'' The uniqueness of the maximum is not required either. The attorneys are considered experts that can identify a* in each specific case. It is very important not to confuse q(a) depicted in Fig. 8 with probability density functions. A probability density function specifies the probabilities of the random outcomes of an event. It is a function of a random variable, e.g., a variable represents win or lose. Nevertheless, q(a) in Fig. 8 is a function of a decision variable, a, instead of a random variable. Therefore, q(a) is by no means a probability density function, and ͐q(a) will not be equal to 1. Furthermore, q(a) should depend on the project's/contract's characteristics, industrial conventions and legal systems. In this model, we assume that q(a) is known by legal experts, and that the attorneys hired by both players are equally good.
͑2͒ Expected compensation ratio. Note that qp is the builder's expected compensation from the owner. As a result, qp is the builder's positive payoff but the owner's negative cost in a lawsuit. According to the formulation above, qp can be rewritten as qpϭq͑a ͒p͑ a ͒ϭaq͑ a ͒C
Therefore we may define the expected compensation ratio from lawsuit, given a, as the ratio of qp to C. That is,
Following our base case in Fig. 8, Fig. 9 shows the lawsuit's expected compensation ratio, a q(a), with respect to a. Also note that q(a) is bounded between 0 and 1, whereas it is reasonable to assume that the upper bound of the claim ratio, a, is a small positive number, e.g., 10. Thus we can show that the set ͕x:xϭa q(a)͖ is bounded. In a bounded set, the existence of the maximum of the set is guaranteed. Therefore, the existence of the maximal expected compensation ratio in the lawsuit for any construction project is guaranteed. The maximum will be denoted as a*q(a*). The attorney is assumed to be the expert on deciding the optimal claim ratio given a specific case. Taking q(a) in Fig.  8 as an example, the optimal claim ratio is around 0.3 as shown in Fig. 9 and its maximal expected compensation ratio would be around 0.18. A rational builder will always claim at his optimal claim ratio in order to maximize his total payoff from lawsuit, q(a*)p(a*)ϪcϪl.
͑3͒ Generalized Nash equilibrium. Again, our discussion focuses on the equilibrium that the builder decides to ''claim'' since there is not much to say about ''not claim.'' Back to the equilibrium derived in case II, the negotiation offer has to satisfy condition ͑9͒, i.e., qpϪcрgpрqpϩd. Multiply the whole equation by 1/C; it becomes
Eq. ͑13͒ can be simplified as
When a rational claimant claims at optimal claim ratio, Eq. ͑14͒ will become ͓q͑ a*͒p͑a*͒Ϫc͔/Cрgp͑a*͒/Cр͓q͑a*͒p͑a*͒ϩd͔/C
Now the only variable left to be decided by both players in Eq. ͑15͒ is the negotiation offer ratio, g. Since it is always true that ͓q(a*) p(a*)Ϫc͔/Cр͓q(a*)p(a*)ϩd͔/C, there must exist a set of g's that will satisfy Eq. ͑15͒ for the generalized Nash equilibrium. Examples expressed by graphics are given below to illustrate the dynamics of the equilibrium. The equilibrium solution in Fig. 10 shows the Pareto optimal and the Nash equilibrium condition, i.e., Eq. ͑15͒, ͓q(a*) p(a*) Ϫc͔/Cрg p(a*)/Cр͓q(a*)p(a*)ϩd͔/C. Both parties will benefit from the negotiate and accept solution by choosing a g such that gp(a*)/C would lie in the shaded area shown in Fig.  10 . The shaded area is defined herein as a negotiation offer ratio zone. Compared to the payoff from ''sue,'' both players will have higher payoffs.
Illustrative Example
We shall use an example to illustrate the analysis of the claim and opportunistic bidding game discussed above. 
University Library versus Gamble Construction Company
Suppose a university is building a new library. The university decides to award the contract based on the competitive bidding. Suppose the engineer's estimate is between $19 million and $21 million, and five contractors' bids range from $17 million to $22 million. Gamble Construction's bid is $17 million, whereas the second lowest bid by Honest Construction is $19 million. The university suspects that Gamble Construction has opportunistically cut his bid price by $3 million to win the project. However, there is not enough evidence to prove this conjecture, so the university needs to award the project to Gamble Construction.
After one and half year of construction, there have been several major claims filed by Gamble Construction and these claims amount to $4 million. Most of these claims are attributed to the inadequate bid information/inferior quality of specifications, working in congested areas, and change of site conditions. If both parties do not reach an agreement regarding the claims in the next two months, a litigation will take place. The estimated litigation opportunity cost for the university is $1.5 million. On the other hand, suppose Gamble Construction has many claim and litigation experiences so that Gamble's litigation opportunity cost is only $0.5 million. Suppose that it is not difficult for an experienced construction claims attorney to assess the chance of success in the litigation with respect to various claims amount as depicted in Table 1 . Gamble also estimated both parties' litigation opportunity costs, cϭ$0.5 million and dϭ$1.5 million. According to Table 1 , Gamble's attorney then suggests that Gamble's optimal claim ratio in the future is 20% of the true costs, $4 million, and the expected compensation from the university is q*p*, which equals $3.20 million. Therefore, the expected payoffs from litigation for Gamble and the university are q*p*Ϫc ϭ$2.7 million gain and q*p*ϩdϭ$4.7 million loss, respectively. In this case, any offer that is greater than $2.7 million is acceptable to the builder. And the owner will offer no more than $4.7 million. In other words, the possible negotiation offers will fall within the range of $2.7 million and $4.7 million. The most possible negotiation settlement that will be reached depends on other factors such as their risk attitude or patience of the parties involved. 2. Given that Gamble Construction is an opportunistic bidder, how much would Gamble consider to cut from the original price? Since the possible negotiation offers are in the range of $2.7 million and $4.7 million, Gamble Construction can consider to cut in the range of $2.7 million and $4.7 million without sacrificing its minimum profit after the claims. Our analysis shows that it is possible that Gamble Construction did cut $3 million to win the project. 3. What could have been done to discourage opportunistic bidding? If the university can deny certain contractors based on bidders' past performances, an opportunistic bidder will suffer the denial in the future bidding invitation/awarding. Such punishment increases Gamble Construction's litigation opportunity costs. For example, if the potential loss from losing future business with the university is $1 million, Gamble's litigation opportunity costs will become $1.5 million, that is, cϭ$1.5 million. Plus, the university can also build an effective claims administration program to lower its litigation opportunity costs, say, to $0.5 million, i.e., dϭ$0.5 million. The negotiation offer range will then become $3.2Ϫ1.5 million and $3.2ϩ0.5 million, i.e., $1.7 million and $3.7 million. If the university further improves the quality of the drawings, specifications, and construction contracts, then q*p* can be reduced, say, to $1.5 million. The negotiation offer range would be reduced to $0, $2 million. This result dramatically discourages the Gamble's opportunistic bidding because the chance for Gamble Construction to become a low bidder will be reduced even if Gamble Construction tried to cut the price within $2 million.
Propositions, Decision Rules, and Strategies

Proposition I
Assume that c, d, a, q(a) , and p(a) are non-negative real numbers and common knowledge, that q(a) is a decreasing function of claim ratio, and that both parties are rational and risk-neutral. If q(a)p(a)Ϫc is non-negative, then to negotiate is a weakly dominant strategy for both parties and the negotiation offer will be no less than q(a)p(a)Ϫc and no greater than q(a)p(a)ϩd, where the weakly dominant strategy is the strategy that is better than or equal to all others.
Proof. Since l is sunk already, the relevant elements for deciding to claim or not is the bidder's expected compensation, q(a)p(a), and litigation opportunity cost, c. Therefore, a rational builder will claim if and only if q(a)p(a)Ϫcу0, that is, q(a)p(a)Ϫc is non-negative. If all assumptions above hold, the builder and the owner will both know the curves of qpϩd and qpϪc, where qpϩd is the loss of the owner, and qpϪc is the payoff of the builder.
Since c,d are non-negative, we have (qpϩd)/Cу(qpϪc)/C ᭙aу0. Therefore, for any aу0, there must exist gR such that g͕x:(qpϩd)/Cуxp(a)/Cу(qpϪc)/C͖, where x is the set of plausible negotiation offer ratios. Here (qpϩd)/Cуgp(a)/C implies that the owner will be better off by offering gp(a) in negotiation, and gp(a)/Cу(qpϪc)/C implies that the builder will also be better off by accepting the offer in negotiation. And for any a, if gp(a)/Cу(qpϩd)/Cу(qpϪc)/C, then the equilibrium solution is ''sue'' and the payoffs for both parties are (qpϩd,qpϪc), which are weakly dominated by the payoff of negotiation equilibrium solution. Similarly, when (qpϩd)/C у(qpϪc)/Cуgp(a)/C, the payoffs for both parties are dominated by the negotiation equilibrium solution. Therefore, to negotiate is a weakly dominant strategy for both parties. ͑End of proof͒
The insight of Proposition I is that if q(a)p(a)Ϫc is nonnegative, there will be a non-negative surplus, cϩd, shared by both parties. We will name this surplus the ''negotiation surplus.'' The negotiation surplus can either be shared by both parties through the negotiation process or be abandoned totally if there is a lawsuit. An interesting question is how this surplus can be divided. The division of the surplus will depend on each party's negotiation power and risk attitude ͑Binmore 1992͒. The party that has more negotiation power and is less risk averse will get more surpluses than the other. Detailed analysis along this path is beyond the scope of this paper but worth further investigating. Levin ͑1998͒ argues that the key to ''a successful project is the successful resolution of contract disputes without resorting to litigation.'' He emphasizes the importance of preventing and handling claims and an effective claims administration program. Our analytical model confirms that resolving the claims through negotiation, instead of litigation, is desired by both parties and explains why more and more construction projects are utilizing the ADR ͑Alternative Dispute Resolution͒ and the DRB ͑Dispute Review Board͒ to reduce construction claims and their impacts on projects.
Corollary I
If all assumptions in Proposition I hold and there exists an a* such that q(a*)p(a*) is a non-negative maximum, a rational builder will claim at a* and the negotiation offer will be no less than q(a*)p(a*)Ϫc and no greater than q(a*)p(a*)ϩd, if and only if q(a*)p(a*)Ϫc is a non-negative maximum of qpϪc.
Proof. According to the profit maximization rationality and Proposition I, a rational builder will claim at a* if and only if q(a*)p(a*)Ϫcу0; that is, q(a*)p(a*)Ϫc is a non-negative maximum. Furthermore, by Proposition I, the payoff of the claimant is no less than q(a)p(a)Ϫc and no greater than q(a)p(a) ϩd. Therefore the negotiation offer will be no less than q(a*)p(a*)Ϫc and no greater than q(a*)p(a*)ϩd, if and only if there exists a non-negative maximum q(a*)p(a*)Ϫc. ͑End of proof͒ Note that according to Corollary I, the builder's claim ratio has nothing to do with the amount $l cut by the builder during the bidding. The builder will follow his profit maximization rationality to decide an optimal claim ratio. As a result, it is possible that the claim ratio a* will exceed the cut down ratio l/C.
One question that might also be raised is why are there still many claim lawsuits in the real world? A plausible reason for the failure of a negotiation solution is that functions q(a), c, and d are not actually common knowledge as assumed in this study. In the real world q(a), c, and d are not common knowledge. They may be perceived by each player quite differently. To a degree, a player may try to utilize this asymmetry and bluff during the negotiation process. In these cases, the perceived q(a*)p(a*) ϩd may not always be greater than q(a*)p(a*)Ϫc. When q(a*)p(a*)ϩdрq(a*)p(a*)Ϫc, the negotiation surplus, c ϩd, will no longer exist and the solution will become litigation. Game theory has further treatment toward this information asymmetry; nevertheless, it is beyond the scope of this research.
Corollary II
If all assumptions in Proposition I hold, the sign and amount of l and the amount of d are irrelevant to the builder's claim or not claim decision.
Proof. According to Proposition I, only q, p, and c determine the claim decision made by the builder; thus l and d are irrelevant to the builder's claim decision. ͑End of proof͒ As Corollary II suggests, the owner should be aware that even though the builder did not lower his bid to win the contract, that is, lϭ0, if there are potential profits from claiming identified by the builder, the builder will have motives to claim to maximize his profits. prevent the builder from finding ''excuses '' or ''evidences'' 
